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It has been forcefully argued that the United States is now one of three 
major global trading blocks, Japan and Europe being the other two; and that 
in many respects it is the weakest of the three.• In support of these proposi-
tions, facts are adduced to demonstrate that in many industries and settings 
the United States has lost its position as a leader or initiator and is now in a 
reactive rather than a pro-active role.2 
The recession from which the United States is just emerging, and in 
which much of the rest of the industrialized world is still mired, differs from 
many others preceding it. In part this is so here because some of the classic 
nostrums appear ineffective. For some time, interest rates in the United States 
have been at their lowest level in decades. 3 Yet the low interest rates do not 
appear to be producing the usual effect of spurring capital investment and 
economic growth as rapidly as might be expected. 
* Professor of law, T.C. Williams School of law, University of Richmond. A.B., J.D., Villanova 
University; LL.M., Columbia University. Research for this article was supported by a generous grant from 
the Faculty Research Fund, University of Richmond. 
I. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see LESTER C. THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD (1992). 
2. ld. at 153-201. 
3. See Rick Wartzman, Bentsen Expects Interest Rates to Hold Steady, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1993, 
at A2; David Wessel, Federal Reserve's Policy-making Panel Kept Steady Stance on Interest Rates, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 27, 1993, at A2. 
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One reason that they have not produced the usual rate of growth has 
been the existence of substantially higher rates in Europe.4 Given the normal 
tendency of capital to seek higher rates of return, some funds otherwise 
available for investment here have sought higher rates of return in Europe. 
Thus, to some extent at least, the growth of the United States' economy is 
.controlled by events in Europe and its monetary policy. The roiling currency 
markets of September 1992 are additional evidence of this phenomenon.5 
Perhaps one good effect of that currency crisis was the attention it focused 
on the interdependence of the global financial system. The little understood, 
in the United States, the European Monetary System ("EMS") and the Euro-
pean Rate Mechanism ("ERM") are now matters of great interest because of 
the effect they have on the value of the dollar and the United States econo-
my. This article discusses the working of the ERM as part of the EMS and 
describes their relationship to European Community law and institutions. 
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
It is widely understood that the ERM and EMS are creatures of the Euro-
pean Community. But it may be somewhat more surprising that EMS, as the 
structure within which the ERM operates, and the ERM itself have been 
functioning substantially in the same form since 1979. Various component 
mechanisms and institutions have been in place for considerably longer. 
The current movement within the EC toward monetary union, with a 
single currency and central bank, embodied in the Treaty on European Union 
(the Maastricht Treaty)6 has been widely discussed.7 That Treaty's provi-
4. Fed Discount Rate- 3%; U.K. base rate- 6%; German Lombard rate- 9%; French rate-
7.25%. Money Rates, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1993, at Cl7. 
5. See generally Mayhem, EcONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 15; Meltdown, EcONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, 
at 69; Martin Wolf, From Delusion to Devaluation, FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 30, 1992, at 20. 
6. Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) l, (C 
224) 1 [hereinafter Treaty on European Union or TEU]. The Treaty on European Union became effective 
Nov. l, 1993. See David Garder, Treaty Celebration Gives Way to Sober Talks, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 30-31, 
1993, at 3. The Treaty on European Union substantially amends portions of the Treaty of Rome. TREATY 
EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
In this article references to Treaty of Rome provisions amended by the TEU are to the EC TREATY 
(as amended 1993); references to Treaty of Rome provisions as they were in effect prior to the TEU are to 
the EEC TREATY; and references to TEU provisions not amending the Treaty of Rome are to the TEU. , 
The Treaty on European Union's provisions on monetary union are contained in TEU, art. G, which 
contains all of the amendments to the Treaty of Rome. Specifically, these provisions are articles l02a-
109m of the EC TREATY (as amended 1993). 
7. See, e.g., Editorial Comments, Post-Maastricht (Monetary Union), 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 199 
(1992); Hugo J. Hahn, The European Centro/ Bank: Key to European Monetary Union or Target?, 28 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 783 (1991); Nancy L. Kessler, Banking on Europe: 1992 and EMU, 60 FORD. L. 
REV. 395 (1992); Rutsel S.J. Martha. The Fund Agreement and the Surrender of Monetary Sovereignty to 
the European Community, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 749 (1993); Wayne Sandholtz, Choosing Union: 
Monetary Politics and Maastricht, 41 INT'L ORO. 1 (1993); Christopher A. Whytock, Eurofed: Toward a 
European System of Central Banks and a European Central Bank, 23 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 469 
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sions for monetary union, both the single currency and the central bank, are 
the capstones of an integrated monetary system. But the Community's drive 
for monetary union did not begin with the run up to the Maastricht Treaty. 
The building blocks on which these significant capstone provisions rest have 
been in place for many years. The Community has been working toward 
centralization and unification of the monetary system for almost thirty 
years.8 
The monetary union provisions of the Treaty on European Union are 
largely adapted from the Delors Report of 1989.9 They envision, as recom-
mended in the Delors Report, a monetary union to be accomplished in stag-
es. 10 One purpose of the ERM is to force member states' currencies into a 
(1992). See generally Trevor C. Hartley. Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agree-
ment, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213 (1993). 
8. See, e.g., Council Decision 64/301 of 8 May 1964 on Cooperation Between Member States in the 
Field of International Monetary Relations, 1963-1964 OJ. SPEC. Eo. 143 [hereinafter Decision on Interna-
tional Monetary Relations Cooperation]; Council Decision 641300 of 8 May 1964 on Cooperation Between 
the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community, 1963-1964 OJ. SPEC. 
Eo. 141 [hereinafter Decision on Central Banks Cooperation]; Commission Memorandum to Council on 
the Co-ordination of Economic Policies and Monetary Cooperation within the Community, 2 BULL. E.C. 
No.3 (Supp. 1969). See also the numerous documents regarding monetary cooperation contained in MON-
ETARY COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, COMPENDIUM OF COMMUNITY MONETARY TEXTS 
(1989)[hereinafter COMPENDIUM]. 
9. See COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, REPORT ON EcONOMIC 
AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989) [hereinafter DELORS REPORT]. At its meet-
ing in June 1988, the European Council reaffirmed its objective of progressive realization of economic and 
monetary union. 2I BULL. E.C. No.6 (1988), at I65. It created a special committee to study the issue and 
propose concrete measures that would help the Council accomplish its goal. /d. The committee was com-
prised of the governors of the central banks of the Member States, three prominent economic and banking 
experts, and two members of the Commission, including Jacques Delors, the president of the Commission. 
Delors chaired the committee. 
The committee issued the Delors Report in April I989. See 22 BULL. E.C. No. 4 (I989), at 8. The 
report reviewed the past developments toward monetary union and restated the advantages of such a un-
ion. It then set forth a blueprint and timetable for accomplishing the union. See generally COMMISSION OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES, EcONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (1990); Andrew Gamble, EMU and 
European Capital Markets: Toward a Unified Financial Market, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 3I9 (199I); 
Kessler, supra note 7, at 4I8-28; Jean-Victor Louis, A Monetary Union for Tomorrow, 26 CoMMON MKT. 
L. REv. 30I (1989); Sandholtz, supra note 7. 
The European Council, despite strong objections from the United Kingdom and Denmark, deter-
mined that monetary union, largely on the terms of the Delors Report, would become a reality. At its 
December I989 meeting, the European Council reiterated the main theme of the Delors Report and con-
vened an intergovernmental conference to prepare amendments to the Treaty of Rome which would ac-
complish economic and monetary union. 22 BULL. E.C. No. I2 (I989), at II. In October I990, despite 
opposition from Britain, the European Council determined that a new institution responsible for Communi-
ty-wide monetary. policy should be created by the Treaty of Rome and that, in the final stage of monetary 
union, there would be a single currency. 23 BULL. E.C. No. IO (1990), at I8. These measures had been 
advocated since at least I970. See infra notes 43 and 47 and accompanying text. Negotiation of these 
provisions, however, proved extremely difficult. See Alison Smith & Quentin Peel, Major Rejects Draft 
Union Treaty, FIN. TIMES, Nov. II, 199I, at I. Agreement was finally reached in December I99I at the 
European Council meeting in Maastricht. 24 BULL. E.C. No. 12 (1991), at 7. The final text of the Treaty 
on European Union was signed at Maastricht on February 7, I992. 25 BULL. E. C. No. I-2 (1992), at II. 
See generally TEU, supra note 6. 
10. DELORS REPORT, supra note 9, at 34-40. At its June I989 meeting the European Council decided 
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very close and stable relationship with one another, thereby facilitating the 
transition to a single currency. The measures comprising the ERM are work-
ing apart from the Treaty on European Union, and are subsumed within it. 
The changes in the ERM agreed upon in August 1993,11 while not altering 
the ERM structure, most likely will mean that the time tables for achieving 
monetary union envisioned in the Treaty on European Union are, at best, 
optimistic. 12 
Monetary union was not one of the explicit goals of the Treaty of Rome 
in its original form. There are, nevertheless, several articles within it dealing 
with monetary policy, in particular with the Member States' conjunctural 
policies and balance of payments practices.13 
Article 103 provided that the Member States' conjunctural policies, that 
is their policies regarding short term business cycles and measures intended 
to stabilize economic trends, were matters of common concern within the 
Community. Each state was obliged by Article 103 to consult with the others 
and with the Commission on measures it wished to take in this area. 14 In 
addition, the Council was authorized to decide upon appropriate Community-
wide measures and to issue directives in this area. 15 A more substantive ob-
ligation was contained in Article 104, by which the Member States were 
obliged "to pursue the economic policy needed to ensure the equilibrium of 
its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its curren-
cy .... "16 This obligation is carried over into Article 105, by which Mem-
ber States were obliged to coordinate their economic policies to cause their 
various administrative departments and their central banks to cooperate .to 
that the first stage would begin on July I, 1990. This is the date that Council Directive 881361 fixes for 
the abolition of all restrictions on the movement of capital. Council Directive 881361 of June 24, 1988 for 
the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, 1988 O.J. (L 78) 5 [hereinafter Directive on Article 67 Im-
plementation]; 22 BULL. E.C. No. 6 (1989), at 11. As provided in the Treaty, the second stage should 
begin January I, 1994. EC TREATY art. 109(e)(l) (as amended 1993). The third stage should begin no 
later than January l, 1999. /d. art. 1090)(4) (as amended 1993). Yet it could begin as early as January l, 
1997. /d. art. 109(e)(3) (as amended 1993). But see infra note 12 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 129, 136-37 and accompanying text. See generally Alan Riding, Softer Franc 
Could Help to Bolster the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at D8; Craig R. Whitney, Europeans 
Agree to Let Currencies Fluctuate Widely, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at Al, D8. 
12. See infra note 176. See generally Lionel Barber, Ministers Veto Early Return to Old ERM, FIN. 
TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1993, at 1; Quentin Peel, Kohl Warns of Two-Year Delay for Monetary Union, FIN. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at I. The August 1993 modifications have not changed the ERM structure or obli-
gations but have significantly modified the "set points." 
13. These provisions, articles 103-109, were not significantly amended by the Single European Act, 
but have been replaced by articles 102a-109 of the Treaty on European Union. EEC TREATY arts. 103-09 
(as amended 1987); EC TREATY arts. 102a-109 (as amended 1993). 
14. EEC TREATY art. 103(1); see Case 9n3, Schluter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach, 1973 E.C.R. 1135. 
15. EEC TREATY art. 103(2). See generally 3 HANS SMJT & PETER E. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE Eu-
ROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY 3-651 to 3-675 (1993). For a list of Council and Commission implement-
ing measures, see id. at 3-651 to -657. 
16. EEC TREATY art. 104. See generally 3 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 15, at 3-679. 
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attain the objective set forth in Article 104!7 Article 107(1), similarly to 
Article 103, made Member States' policies regarding exchange rates a matter 
of common concern. Member States were authorized by Article 107(2) to 
take countermeasures in the event another Member State altered its exchange 
rates in a manner which is inconsistent with the objective of Article 104 and 
which seriously distorts competition.18 · 
Articles 108 and I 09 dealt with balance of payment problems and both 
provided the possibility of mutual assistance among Member States to ease 
these crises and allowed Member States to take limited protective mea-
sures.19 
Despite these modest substantive obligations, the Treaty of Rome dealt 
with monetary cooperation matters institutionally, or structurally, in a more 
substantial way. A Monetary Committee was created by Article 105(2), to be 
comprised of two persons from each Member State and two from the Com-
mission. The two national members were to be representatives of the respec-
tive Member State's treasury or finance ministry and its central bank.20 As 
established, this Committee has advisory status. It was charged with review-
ing the monetary and financial situation and the general payment system in 
the Member States and the Community and was to report on these matters to 
the Council and the Commission. 21 In addition, it was to be consulted on 
certain matters regarding the free movement of capital22 and balance of pay-
ments.23 
By the mid-1960s, the Council had assigned the Monetary Committee a 
more active, although still only c~nsultative, role in international monetary 
matters. Consultations were to take place within the Monetary Committee 
regarding important decisions or positions taken by Member States in inter-
national monetary matters, including those pertaining to the general working 
of the international monetary system.24 Moreover, the Member States were 
only to take such decisions or positions after consultation with the Monetary 
Committee.25 However, the exception to this requirement is stated so broad-
17. EEC TREATY art. 105(1). See generally 3 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note I5, at 3-607 to -697. 
18. EEC TREATY art. 107; see also id. art. 103. 
19. ld. arts. 108-09. See generally JEAN-VICfOR LoUIS, FROM EMS TO MONETARY UNION (1990); 3 
SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 15, at 3-694.12(13) to -.12(98). 
20. EEC TREATY art. 105(2). See generally RICHARD W. EDWARDS JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
COLLABORATION 83 (1985); LoUIS, supra note I9, at 15. Under the Treaty on European Union, the Euro-
pean Monetary Institute will replace the Monetary Committee at the beginning of the second stage, Janu-
ary I, 1994. EC TREATY art. 109(f) (as amended 1993). Its function and procedures are set forth in proto-
col 4 to the Treaty on European Union. TEU, supra note 6, protocol 4. 
21. EEC TREATY art. 105(2). 
22. ld. arts. 69, 71, 73. 
23. ld. arts. I07-109. 
24. Decision on International Monetary Relations Cooperation, supra note 8, art. 2; see Directive on 
Article 67 Implementation, supra note 10; see also 3 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 15, at 2-737 to -745. 
25. Decision on International Monetary Relations Cooperation, supra note 8, art. 2. 
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ly that such consultations were not encouraged.26 
Over the years, the Monetary Committee's role evolved to be a supervi-
sory and coordinating one in all matters involving monetary affairs, both in 
preparation for Council discussions on finance and monetary matters and 
otherwise. Also, it was assigned a specific role in the fixing of central ex-. 
change rates against the European Currency Unit (the "ECU").27 
At the same time the Monetary Committee's mandate was expanded, the 
Council created a separate entity, the Committee of Governors of the Central 
Banks of the Member States.28 , The Commission has no member on this 
committee, but is invited to send a representative to attend its meetings. As 
stated in the Council Decision establishing this committee, its ambit of au~ 
thority was twofold: (i) to hold consultations regarding general principles and 
policies of the central banks, in particular,. regarding credit and the money 
and foreign exchange markets; and (ii) to exchange information regarding the 
most important measures falling within the competence of the banks and to 
examine those measures.29 It also had a role in the working of the ERM.30 
The need for stable currency relationships within the Community - if 
not a single currency - in order that the overall objectives of the Communi-
ty might be attained is obvious. The previously mentioned articles in the 
Treaty of Rome demonstrate that the signatories were mindful of these needs; 
but clearly the Treaty left the field largely inchoate. 
The initial goal of the EC was economic interpretation not monetary 
integration. This is so in part because during the EC's early history, the 
international monetary system was relatively stable, as were exchange rates. 
This stable external order explains in part the paucity of Treaty of Rome 
provisions regarding monetary integration. Rates were fixed under the 
Bretton Woods Agreement's regulation of exchange rates.31 
26. The exception to the requirement for consultation is "when circumstances and in particular the 
time limits .. · . require otherwise." ld. 
27. See infra-notes 108-12 and accompanying text. Its activities are reported periodically in the BUL-
LETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES [BULL. E.C.). 
28. Decision on Central Banks Cooperation, supra note 8, art. I. 
29. ld. art. 3. 
30. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. In 1990, durlng the first stage of monetary union, 
the role of this Committee was expanded. Council Decision 90/142 of Mar. 12, 1990 Amending Council 
Decision 64/300/EEC on Cooperation Between the Central Banks of the Member States of the European 
Economic Community, 1990 0.1. (L 78) 25. Among the changes were requirements that national authori-
ties: (l) .consult the Committee before making major monetary policy decisions; (2) express opinions to 
Member State governments and the Council on policies that might affect the internal and external mone-
tary situation in the Community; and (3) prepare annual reports on their monetary and financial condi-
tions. /d. art. 3. The Delors Report had recommended that these changes to the Committee's competence 
be implemented during the first stage of monetary union. DELORS REPORT, supra note 9, at 35. 
31. JOSEPH A. GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 137 (1988); 
see Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended 
May 31, 1969, 20 U.S.T.I.A.S. 2775, and Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T.I.A.S. 2204. 
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Clearly an unstable monetary system with widely fluctuating exchange 
rates hinders the goals of economic integration and barrier-free trade. Widely 
fluctuating rates themselves are ·barriers to trade. Moreover, widely divergent 
fiscal and monetary policies among the Member States - while perhaps 
necessary because of differing economic conditions - contribute to fluc-
tuating exchange rates and currency instability. Measures taken in ·one 
Member State to combat serious inflation, or the threat of inflation - such 
as high interest rates when low rates prevail in another sluggish economy -
create a serious cross current which adversely affects governments and pri-
vate interests in the respective countries. The need for coordinated economic 
and monetary plans among the members is obvious. Some measures taken by 
the European Community in this regard pre-date the Single European Ace2 
and measures taken pursuant to its 1992 program to assure the free move-
ment of capitaV3 
The Treaty of Rome provisions referred to, while noting that matters 
such as conjunctural policy and balance of payments were matters of com-
mon concern, obligated the Member States to do very little. Consultations 
were to take place before significant measures were taken, but the Member 
States were free to act independently and in their own interests.34 In certain 
areas, Member States were authorized to take individual countermeasures.35 
Moreover, there were few Community based initiatives in this general area. 
Although in the early years the Community established the structure for 
dealing with monetary cooperation matters, the Community's activity in the 
field was modest. The monetary policy, including currency. values and hal-
32. See, e.g., Council Decision 12Dn4 of 8 February 1974 on the Attainment of a High Degree of 
Convergence of the Economic Policies of the Member States of the European Community, 1974 O.J. (L 
63) 1; Council Decision 141n1 of 22 March 1971 on the Strengthening of Coordination of Short-Term 
Economic Policies of the Member States of the European Economic Communities, 1971 O.J. SPEC. Eo. 
174; Council Decision 69/227 of 17 July 1969 on Coordination of the Short-Term Economic Policies 
Cycle Policy of the Member States, 1969 O.J. SPEC. Eo. 350; Decision on International Monetary Rela-
tions Cooperation, supra note 8. See generally 3 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 15, at 3-679 to -685. 
33. After the Single European Act and the 1992 Program, the need for an effective Community-based 
enforcement of a stable monetary regimen became even more imperative. As part of the Single Market 
Program, all restrictions on capital movement were to be eliminated. Capital could move freely from a low 
interest rate member to a high interest rate country, thereby potentially exacerbating the exchange rate dis-
parity. For example, article 1 of the Directive on Article 67 Implementation requires Member States to 
abolish all restrictions on free movement of capital from one state to another. Directive on Article 67 
Implementation, supra note 10, art. 1. The Commission, after consulting the Monetary Committee and the 
Committee of Governors of the Central Banks, may authorize a Member State to take certain protective 
measures in the event that short-term capital movements of exceptional size pose a severe strain on the 
foreign exchange markets and disturb the conduct of a Member State's monetary and exchange rate poli-
cies. ld. art. 3.1. If a Member State takes such measures unilaterally because of the urgency of the situa-
tion, it must report these facts to the Commission. The Commission would then determine whether the 
Member State may maintain such measures. ld. art. 3.2. 
34. See, e.g., Decision on International Monetary Relations Cooperation, supra note 8. 
35. See, e.g., EEC TREATY arts. 107(2), 108, 109. 
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ance of payments matters, remained a matter of Member State concern. 
While Article 104 of the Treaty appeared to at least obligate Member States 
to have regard for the effects of their policies on other states, the policies .. 
remained the prerogative of the Member States.36 Further although Article; 
107 provided that exchange rates are a matter of common concern, it did not 
require the coordination of monetary policy or concerted action. Each Mem-
ber State remained free to establish its own rates of exchange.37 Despite this 
status of the "law," the Community had begun to encourage joint action for 
monetary cooperation - and indeed union - early on. 
The EC Council articulated very early the need for coordinate or joint 
action in the area of monetary policy. The preamble to the Council's 1964 
decision to create the Committee of the Governors of the Central Banks38 
states that economic union must "include the implementation of economic 
and monetary policies that help insure stable exchange parities between the 
currencies of the Member States."39 The need for convergent monetary poli-
cies became more critical in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the unravel-
ling of the Bretton Woods system.40 In the late 1960's, Chancellor Brandt 
suggested an EC program to be phased in over several years, beginning with 
harmonized short term monetary policies and proceeding to a monetary union 
of fixed exchange rates.41 
By the end of the 1960s sufficient agreement on this matter was reached 
for the Commission to authorize a major study by national and EC officials 
of the prospects for monetary union.42 The resulting Werner Report43 of 
October 1970 was a significant guiding force in the construction of the EMS 
as it presently exists. It was quite explicit in its recommendations regarding 
monetary cooperation and union and timetables for their implementation. It 
suggested ·monetary union was realizable by 1980.44 Upon its conclusion, 
36. Michael H. Ryan, The Treaty of Rome and Monetary Policy in the European Community, 10 Or-
TAW A L. REv. 535, 538 (1978). 
37. Joined Cases 9 & IJnJ. Compagnie d'Approvisionnement de Transport et de Credit S.A. v. Com-
mission, 1972 E.C.R. 391. 400; Case 9n3, Schluter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach, 1973 E.C.R. IJ35, IJ61; 
Case IOn3, Rewe-Zentral v. Hauptzollamt Kehl, 1973 E.C.R. IJ75, IJ91; see Ryan, supra note 36, at 
541-43. 
38. Decision on International Monetary Relations Cooperation, supra note 8, pmbl. 
39. ld. The origin of the EMS can be traced to this Council decision. GoLD, supra note 31, at 141. 
40. DANIEL GROS & NIELS THYGESEN, EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION 12 (1992); LOUIS, supra 
note 19, at 12; Ryan, supra note 36, at 545. 
41. GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 40, at 12; see also David Cobham, The European Monetary Sys-
tem: An Economic Perspective, 1988 Y.B. EuR. L. 87, 88, 93. 
42. Integral Text of the Final Communique of the Conference of the Heads of State or Government on 
Dec. 2, 1969 at the Hague, 3 BULL. E.C. No. 11 (Supp. 1970), at 31. 
43. Report to the Council and the Commission on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Mone-
tary Union in Community, 3 BULL. E.C. No. II (Supp. 1970), at 3 [hereinafter Werner Report]. This 
report was named after Pierre Werner, the Finance Minister of Luxembourg, who chaired the study. 
44. /d. at 26-29. The report did not set forth a precise timetable. It suggested a variety of substantive 
and institutional measures which could be taken in two phases. The first phase was a period of three 
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this union was to include elimination of exchange rate fluctuations, irrevoca-
ble fixing of parity rates and free movement of capital.4' The Report 
stressed the need for Community based action, in contrast to the individual 
Member State action, for the coordination of economic and monetary poli-
cies,46 and urged· the creation of various institutions to administer the mone-
tary union.47 
Less than a year later, the Council and representatives of the Member 
States adopted a Resolution on the Attainment of Economic and Monetary 
Union,48 which gave effect to various suggestions and recommendations in 
the Werner Report. Through this Resolution, the Member States expressed 
their will to establish a monetary union during the decade beginning in 
1971,~9 and they presented various short term measures which were to be 
taken to accomplish this goal. Among other things, the Resolution provided 
that during a three year period (ending in December 1976) the Council 
should set forth provisions for strengthening the coordination of short term 
economic policies; setting forth the outlines for a Community-wide economic 
policy, the harmonization of the instruments of economic policies among 
Member States and the synchronization of national budgetary procedures.'0 
The Council agreed that additional emphasis should be placed on obligatory 
prior consultation by the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Gov-
ernors of the Central Banks with the aim of strengthening the coordination of 
monetary policy.51 The central banks were invited to coordinate their poli-
cies.52 Also, they were invited on an experimental basis to hold exchange 
rate fluctuations within narrower margins than those in force for the U;S. 
dollar.53 
The Council noted that, depending on the results of harmonizations of 
economic policies and other circumstances, measures might be taken to es-
years, beginning January 1971. ld. at 27. The second phase would begin January 1974 and could result in 
economic and monetary union by the end of the decade. ld. at 26; see Cobham, supra note 41, at 88. 
45. Werner Report, supra note 43, at 26. 
46. /d. at 10, 26. 
47. ld. at 12-13, 17-18, 25. 
48. Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 
22 March 1971, on the Attainment by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union, 1971 J. 0. (C 28) 1 · 
[hereinafter Resolution on Attainment of Economic & Monetary Union]; COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 
33. This Resolution is not a binding legal commitment. The Commission had requested this in a Memo-
randum and Proposal to the Council on the Establishment by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union, 
1970 J.O. (C 140) 20. The Commission had made similar proposals as early as 1964. Ryan, supra note 
36, at 544 n.33. 
49. Resolution on Attainment of Economic & Monetary Union, supra note 48, art. I; see Werner 
Report, supra note 43, at 27-28. 
50. Resolution on Attainment of Economic & Monetary Union, supra note 48, art. III, § 1. 
51. ld. art. III, § 5(i). 
52. ld. art. III, § 5(ii); see Werner Report, supra note 43, at 11. 
53. Resolution on Attainment of Economic & Monetary Union, supra note 48, art. III, § 7; see 
Werner Report, supra note 43, at 28; infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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tablish a de jure system of intervention in currencies and a reduction in the 
margin· of fluctuation between currencies.S4 The Council committed itself to 
adopt before the end of the first stage (December 1976) measures which 
would' ultimately lead to full economic and monetary union.ss 
That the Council intended to move· the· members from an obligation to 
consult, which may have been nothing more than a notification after the 
fact,s6 to something more binding is evident from . a Decision issued that 
same day. In Council Decisions of 22 March 197l,s7 the Member States 
became obligated to coordinate their monetary and credit policies.ss The 
central banks, within their own authority, were invited to coordinate their 
policies in monetary and credit matters, and to establish guidelines to be fol-
lowed regarding liquidity, terms for credit and interest rates.s9 
_The Werner Report outlined in considerable detail the advantages of 
narrowing bilateral exchange rate fluctuations.60 The Community took sig-
nificant steps in this regard in late 1971 and early 1972, when the members 
agreed to limit exchange rate· fiuctuations.61 
Finally in 1973, the Council established the European Monetary Coopera-
54. Resolution on Attainment of Economic & Monetary Union; supra note 48, art. III, § 7; see 
Werner Report, supra note 43, at 28. 
55. Resolution on Attainment of Economic & Monetary Union, supra note 48, art. IV. 
56. LoUIS, supra note 19, at 14. 
57. Council Decision 142171 of 22 March 1971 ori Strengthening of Cooperation between the Central 
Banks of the Membi:r States of the European Economic Community, 1971 O.J. SPEC. Ed .. 176. 
58. /d. art. I. 
59. /d. art. 2. 
60. Werner Report, supra note 43, at 6-7. 
61. Agreement of Central Banks 24 April 1972 on Narrowing of Exchange Rate Margins, COMPENDI-
UM, supra note 8, at 60 [hereinafter Baste Agreement]; see GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 40, at 16-17; 
Ryan, supra note 36, at 545-48. Under the Bretton Woods Agreement, currencies were assigned a par 
value in terms of the gold value of the U.S. dollar; they .were allowed to fluctuate only minimally from 
that value. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 20, 491~568. In December 1971 the Smithsonian Agree-
ment was reached, under which a realignment of exchange rates was accomplished through the devalua-
tion of the U.S. dollar in relation to gold, and a readjustment in the values of other currencies in view of 
this devaluation. Communique of the Ministerial Meeting_ of the Group of Ten, Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in 
23 INT'L FIN. NEWS SURV. 417, 417 (1972). These readjustments were an attempt to redress the U.S. 
balance of payment crisis. Under the agreement, rates were allowed to fluctuate as much as 9% from the 
par value. The effort did not succeed and within several months many countries, including the U.S., sim-
ply allowed their currencies to float. Press Communique of the EEC Council of Finance Ministers, Mar. 
12, 1973, IMF SURV., Mar. 26, 1973, at 88; Press Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the Group 
of Ten and the European Economic Community, Mar. 16, 1973, id.; EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 497-500. 
. The Basle Agreement was the European Community Member States' response to the Smithsonian 
Agreement. A conclusion of the Werner Report was that narrOwer exchange rate margins, leading to 
stabler exchange rate relationships, were preferable as a means of achieving economic and monetary inte-
gration. In the Basle Agreement, many of the EC members attempted to implement this notion. They 
agreed that their currencies could fluctuate in relation to one another by only 4.5% ( /-2.25%), half that 
allowed by the Smithsonian Agreement. This arrangement was referred to as the "snake in the dollar tun-
neL" After March 1972, when currencies began to float, this agreement stood alone, without the walls of 
the "tunneL'' See Cobham, supra note 41, at 89; Richard W. Edwards, The European Exchange Rate Ar-
rangements Called the 'Snake,' 10 TOL. L. REV. 47, 48-54 (1978). 
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tion Fund ("EMCF'),62 as recommended in the Werner Report.63 This en-
tity was established to take the actions necessary for a proper functioning of 
the Community exchange system, the multilateralization of currency positions 
resulting for central bank intervention and administration of short term fi-
nancing.64 The EMCF is ·administered by a board of governors who are in 
fact the same individuals who are the members of the Central Bank Com-
mittee.65 Later this entity was given the authority to issue ECU's and to 
play a pivotal role in the EMS.66 
Monetary union cannot take place unless the economic and monetary 
policies and positions of the Member States are in a state of equilibrium; 
they must have arrived at about the same place at the same time. Article 103 
of the Treaty of Rome set the stage for a process to achieve such co-inci-
dence by providing that the Member States treat their conjectural polices -
that is, their short term business cycle policies and measures intended to 
stabilize economic trends- as matters of common concem.67 
The European Community, building on Article 103 and the Resolution 
on Attainment of Economic and Monetary Union,68 moved in earnest from 
the individual action allowed under the Treaty of Rome to coordinated and 
Community based action in 1974. On 18 February 1974, the Council issued 
the Convergence Decision.69 This Decision set up a structure for frequent 
meetings regarding economic and monetary matters, including three Council 
meetings a year to review the economic conditions within the Community.70 
In Article 1, the Council took for itself the right to issue guidelines in the 
form of directives, decisions and recommendations which the Member States 
"are to follow in order to achieve harmonious economic development."71 
The Convergence Decision also directed the Member States to initiate prior 
consultations before changing the parity, central rate or intervention points of 
62. Council Regulation 907n3 of 3 April 1973 Esiablishing a European Monetary Fund, 1973 OJ. (L 
89) 2 [hereinafter Regulation Esiablishing European Monetary Fund]. 
63. Werner Report, supra note 43, at 23, 29. 
64. Jd. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 85. 
65. Regulation Establishing European Monetary Fund, supra note 62; Statute of the European Mone-
tary Cooperation Fund, art. I, 1973 OJ. (L 89) 4. 
66. See infra notes 86, 190-95 and accompanying text. 
67. EEC TREATY art. 103. 
68. Resolution on Attainment of Economic & Monetary Union, supra note 48. 
69. Council Decision 120n4 of 18 February 1974 on the Attainment of a High Degree of Conver-
gence of the Economic Policies of the Member States of the European Economic Community, 1974 OJ. 
(L 63) 16 [hereinafter Decision on Convergence of Economic Policies], as amended by Council Decision 
787n5 of 18 December 1975, 1975 OJ. (L 330) 52, and Council Decision 136n9 of 6 February 1979, 
1979 OJ. (L 35) 8; see Werner Report, supra note 43, at 27. 
70. Decision on Convergence of Economic Policies, supra note 69, art. I. 
71. Jd. Although somewhat vaguely worded, this sentence appears to impose ·on Member States an 
obligation to follow the guidelines. See Rene Smits, Some Aspects of the Monetary Law of the European 
Community, in 2 LEG. ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 39, 64 (1983). 
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its currency.72 
In a companion Directive,73 the Member States were obligated to imple-
ment short and medium term economic polices in accordance with the 
Council's guidelines, and to refer to them when articulating major economic 
decisions.74 The Commission was given authority to make recommendations 
to. any Member State whose economic, monetary or budgetary policies de-
parted from the guidelines issued by the Council, or entailed economic risks 
for the Community.7' 
This institutional structure existed until 1978 when the EMS, as it is 
known today, became effective. The Single European Act/6 ("SEA") which 
amended the Treaty of Rome in 1986, really did not change the 1978 struc-
ture of EMS. In fact it confirmed that structure. The Treaty of Rome provi-
sions previously discussed, Articles 103, 104, 105 and 107, were not amend-
ed by that Act. But, in the Preamble to the SEA, the signatories acknowl-
edged that as early as 1972 the heads of state or government approved the 
objective of the Community as being both economic and monetary union.77 
The Preamble also acknowledges the constitutive documents of EMS78 and 
notes that steps have been taken to implement the system of monetary coop-
eration.79 The SEA added a new article, Article 102(a), to the Treaty of 
Rome,80 which reaffirmed the Member States' obligations under the existing 
system of EMS.81 Article 102(a) noted that convergence of economic and 
72. Decision on Convergence of Economic Policies, supra note 69, art. 7. 
73. Council Decision l2tn4 of 5 March 1974 on the Stability, Growth and Full Employment in the 
Community, 1974 O.J. (L 63) 19 [hereinafter Decision on Employment in Community]. 
74. ld. 
75. /d. art. 11. As part of the first stage of monetary union outlined in the DELORS REPoRT, supra 
note 9, both Council Decision on Convergence of Economic Policies, supra note 69, and Council Decision 
on Employment in Community, supra note 73, were repealed and replaced by Council Decision 141/90. 
Council Decision 141190 of March 12, 1990 on the Attainment of Progressive Convergence of Economic 
Policies and Performance During Stage One of Economic and Monetary Union, 1990 O.J. (L 78) 23. This 
decision emphasized that achievement of the goals of the Single European Act would require more effec-
tive policy coordination because the Single European Act will increase financial integration, and that prog-
ress toward monetary union would require a high degree of convergence of economic performance be-
tween Member States through close coordination of economic policies. /d. at pmbl. The Council deter-
mined that it would undertake a multifaceted surveillance of economic and monetary matters. Jd. art. 3; 
see text accompanying supra note 33. This more comprehensive approach was recommended in the Delors 
Report. OELORS REPoRT, supra note 9, at 34. 
76. EEC TREATY (as amended 1987); see George A. Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Con-
stitution for the Community?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1989). 
77. EEC TREATY pmbl. (as amended 1987). The preamble to the Treaty of Rome and the objectives 
set forth in article 2 do not mention monetary union. EEC TREATY art. 2, pmbl. 
78. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
79. EEC TREATY pmbl. (as amended 1987). 
80. /d. art. 102(a)(as amended 1987). 
81. /d. See generally 3 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 15, at 3-603 to -640.49. For a discussion of the 
evolution of the monetary provisions of the Single European Act, see Jean-Victor Louis, 'Monetary 
Capacity' in the Single European Act, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (1988). 
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monetary policy is necessary for the further development of the Community. 
In order to achieve this convergence, Member States were obliged by Article 
102(a) to cooperate in accordance with Article 104; and in so doing they 
should take into account their experiences within EMS and the development 
of the ECU.82 The reference in this article to both the EMS and the ECU 
was an acknowledgment in the Treaty itself of EMS, its structure and operat-
ing documents, which prior to this had been acknowledged only in secondary 
legislation and in quasi-Community documents.83 
IT. PRESENT SYSTEM IN OPERATION 
EMS as currently structured is set forth in a series of documents agreed 
to in 1978. They are: (i) Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 
1978 (hereinafter the "Brussels Resolution");84 (ii) several very specific 
Council Decisions85 and regulations;86 and (iii) an agreement among the 
central banks.87 As structured in 1978, EMS was intended to require closer 
monetary cooperation among the Member States, which in tum would lead to 
monetary stability within the Community.88 
As envisioned in the Brussels Resolution, EMS has several purposes: (i) 
to provide a means of attaining a degree of monetary stability through stabili-
zation of exchange rates within very narrow bands; (ii) to support closer 
monetary cooperation; and (iii) to foster economic and monetary union.89 
82. EEC TREATY art. l02(a). 
83. This amendment to the Treaty of Rome to some extent made irrelevant a previous legal uncer-
tainty as to the status of the EMS and the ERM within Community law. The Treaty on European Union, 
however, in a sense reintroduces this uncertainty. See infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text. 
84. Resolution of the European Council on the Establishment of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) and Related Matters, reprinted in COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 45 [hereinafter Brussels Resolu-
tion]; see 11 BULL E.C. No.9 (1978), at 24. 
85. Council Decision l04ln8 of 21 December 1978 Amending Council Decision 143nl Setting Up 
Machinery for Medium-Term Financial Assistance, 1978 OJ. (L 379) 3 [hereinafter Decision Amending 
Medium-Term Financial Assistance]. 
86. Council Regulation, 3180n8 of 18 December 1978 Changing the Value of the Unit of Account 
Used by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, 1978 OJ. (L 379) I [hereinafter Regulation Changing 
Value of EMF Unit] (creating the ECU); Council Regulation 318ln8 of 18 December 1978 Relating to 
the European Monetary System, 1978 OJ. (L 379) 2 [hereinafter Regulation Relating to European Mone- · 
tary System] (expanding the role of the EMCF to receive monetary reserves and to issue ECUs in ex-
change for the monetary reserves). 
87. Agreement Between the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Community Laying 
Down Operating Procedures for the European Monetary System, 13 March 1970, reprinted in COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 8, at 50 [hereinafter Central Bank Agreement]. This agreement supersedes the earlier 
Baste Agreement. Central Bank Agreement, supra, art. 22.1; Baste Agreement, supra note 61. This Cen-
tral Bank Agreement is often referred to as the Basle Agreement, the name of the earlier agreement which 
it superseded. In addition, there are decisions of the Board of Governors of the EMCF that parallel several 
provisions in the Central Bank Agreement. See Jean-Jacques Rey, The European Monetary System, 17 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7 (1980). 
88. Annex to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council, reprinted in COMPENDIUM, 
supra note 8, at 43; Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. AI, § l. 
89. Ralph J. Mehnert, The European Currency Unit- the ECU- Currency for the United States of 
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The stabilization of rates within narrow bands is to be accomplished through 
the ERM. These stable rates in tum would facilitate attainment of the other 
objective, monetary union. 
The Brussels Resolution establishes the EMS structure. As an agreement 
among the heads of state and governments of the Member States sitting as 
the European Council, the Resolution has no clear status within the hierarchy 
of Community law;90 but it is a political commitment of the highest order. 
While some of its provisions are implemented by Community legislation and 
a variety of the constitutive documents of EMS, other parts of EMS - in-
deed the very core of the ERM - remain outside Community legislation . 
. The EMS and ERM function through the medium of the European Cur-. 
rency Unit (the ECU), a then and as yet artificial currency unit.91 Over time 
the ECU has become the currency for all internal community purposes; the 
budget is expressed in ECU's92 and fines for violation of EC rules, for ex-
ample the competition rules, are stated in ECU's. The ECU is increasingly 
used in private transactions as well.93 
The ECU is a "basket" currency unit. As created in 1978, the ECU was 
comprised of a specified amount of the currencies of each of the Member 
States, and it was assigned the same value as its predecessor, the European 
Unit of Account.94 The aggregate value of the EUA also was equal to the 
value of one special drawing right as set by the IMF. That speCial drawing 
right in tum had a value equal to the dollar value of one ounce of gold. Thus 
the ECU as originally defined had a value relative to the dollar and to an 
external unit, the SDR.95 
As originally composed in 1978, the amount of each Member State's 
currency included in the ECU was a negotiated decision, one intended to re-
flect the relative strength ·of the Member States' economies, based on gross 
domestic product and participation in Community external trade. However, 
the decision also included some subjective factors as wel1.96 It was not in-
Europe, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 349, 361 (1989). 
90. See infra note 137. 
91. Regulation Changing Value of EMF Unit, supra note 86. See generally ECU: THE CURRENCY OF 
EUROPE (Christopher Johnson ed., 1991); CHRIS SUNT, LEGAL ASPECfS OF THE ECU (1990); J.A. Usher, 
The Legal Regulation of the European Currency Unit, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 249, 256 (1988). 
92. Financial Regulation 1176/80 of 16 December 1980 Amending the Financial Regulation of De-
cember 21, 1977 as Regards the Use of the ECU in the General Budget of the European Communities, 
1980 OJ. (L 345) 23. 
93. See SUNT, supra note 91; Jean-Victor Louis & Etienne de Lhoneux, The Development of the Use 
of the ECU: Legal Aspects, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 335 (1991). 
94. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A2, § l; Regulation Changing Value of EMF Unit, supra 
note 86; Communication on the Calculation of the Equivalents of the ECU and the European Unit of 
Account, 1979 O.J. (C 69) 4. 
95. GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 40, at 204; SUNT, supra note 91, at 4; Usher, supra note 91, at 
257. 
96. GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 40, at 207; SUNT, supra note 91, at 5. 
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tended that this original composition be fixed forever. The composition of 
the ECU- that is, the amount of each Member State's currency in the ECU 
- was to be reviewed, and possibly altered, every five years.97 Review 
could also be requested by any Member State if the value of any of that 
Member State's currencies changed by 25% or more.98 Since 1978 there 
have been two revisions of the composition of the ECU; one in 1984, when 
the Greek drachma was added,99 and one in 1989, when the Portuguese es-
cudo and the Spanish peseta were added.100 The next regular revision would 
have been in 1994. However, with the entry of the Treaty on European Un-
ion into force, the composition of the ECU has been frozen at the 1989 re-
composition. 101 
·The ECU consists of stated portions of each Member State's curren-
cies.102 It thus has no intrinsic value of its own. Nor does it directly have 
. any value in relation to the Member States' currencies. A value can be as-
cribed to the ECU only by reference to an external item such as gold or 
perhaps another currency. The external item which the Community has 
adopted for use in establishing the value of the ECU is the U.S. dollar. 103 
The value of the ECU is simply the arithmetic sum of the U.S. dollar 
value of the fixed portions of national currencies. 104 This results, of course, 
97. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A2, § 3. 
98. ld. 
99. Council Regulation 2626/84 of 15 September 1984 Amending Article I of Council Regulation 
3180n8 Changing the Value of the Unit of Account Used by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, 
1984 O.J. (L 247) I [hereinafter 1984 Regulation Amending Value of EMF Unit]. 
100. Council Regulation 1971/89 of 19 June 1989 Amending Article I of Regulation 3180n8 Amend-
ing the Value of the Unit of Account Used by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, 1989 OJ. (L 
189) I [hereinafter 1989 Regulation Amending Value of EMF Unit]. 
101. COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES: EcONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (1993), available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, EURSCP File. 
102. After the 1989 recomposition, the ECU consists of the following amounts of national currencies: 
.6242 German marks; .08784 British pounds; 1.332 French francs; 151.8 Italian lira; .2198 Dutch guilders; 
3.43 Belgian francs; .13 Luxembourg francs; .1976 Danish krones; .0085 Irish pounds; 1.44 Greek drach-
mas; 6.885 Spanish pesetas; and 1.393 Portuguese escudos. GROS & THYGESEN, supra note 40, at 207; 
ECU: THE CURRENCY OF EUROPE, supra note 91, at 16; Mehnert, supra note 89, at 376. 
As originally composed in 1979, the ECU consisted of the following amounts of national currencies: 
.828 German marks; .0885 British pounds; 1.15 French francs; 109 Italian lira; .286 Dutch guilders; 3.66 
Belgian francs; .14 Luxembourg francs; .217 Danish krones; and .00759 Irish pounds. Regulation Chang-
ing Value of EMF Unit, supra note 86, art. I. 
103. Communication on the Calculation of the Equivalents of the ECU and the European Unit of Ac-
count, supra note 94. 
104. The method used is simply to multiply the portion of each national currency comprising the ECU 
by its dollar value and then to add these results. See Communication on the Calculation of the Equivalents 
of the ECU and the European Unit of Account, supra note 94, at 5. This is the method the Commission 
uses: most business days the central bank of each Member State identifies an accepted exchange rate 
between its currency and the dollar as of 2:30 p.m. Brussels time. Each central bank communicates this 
rate to the Banque National de Belgique, which in tum communicates all of the exchange rates to the 
Commission. The Commission then computes the value of the ECU, expressed in dollars and in the cur-
rency of each Member State. ld. at 4; see EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 317 n.8. These values are pub-
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in the value of the ECU expressed in U.S. dollars. The value of the ECU on 
a given day in any Member State's currency can be determined by dividing 
the ECU's dollar value on that day (as determined in the manner described) 
by the Member State's currency exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar. 105 The 
ECU's value thus floats daily as the Member States' currencies change in 
relation to the U.S. dollar. However, since the ECU is a basket comprised of 
twelve currencies, it ought to be considerably more stable than any one of 
the composite currencies. As the dollar appreciates against one currency, it 
may depreciate against another. This fact illustrates an advantage of denomi-
nating contract or other obligations in ECU' s rather than directly in dollars or 
other member currencies. There will most likely be less fluctuation in the 
value of the basket ECU in relation to another currency than there would be 
in the value of other currencies. 106 
It is also possible to determine the relative weight of each currency in the 
ECU, that is, the percentage each currency represents in the aggregate value· 
of the ECU. A currency's weight is that currency's fixed portion in the ECU 
divided by the aggregate value of the ECU expressed in that currency (deter-
mined in the manner described in the preceding paragraph). 107 Again the 
relative weight or percentage of a currency in the aggregate value of the 
ECU will fluctuate depending on the changes in that currency's value in 
relation to the dollar. A depreciation of the currency in relation to the dollar 
will decrease its weight and an appreciation against the dollar will increase 
its weight. The weight will of course also change upon recomposition of the 
basket. The. Brussels Resolution requires the periodic re-examination of the 
lished in the Official Journal and are carried in the foreign exchange listings in major newspapers. See, 
e.g., 1993 O.J. (C 314) 2; World Stock Markets, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993, at 24; Exchange Rates, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 31, 1993, at 24. The aggregate value of the ECU is thus partly determined by each Member 
State. The Commission does not determine the exchange rate between the national currencies and the 
dollar. Rather, it accepts the exchange rates provided by the central banks'. 
105. See Mehnen, supra note 89, at 370. For example, if the value of the ECU were $1.11690 (its 
value on Jan. 5, 1994), then the value of the ECU in marks is $1.11690 divided by the dollar value of one 
mark ($.5752), or 1.9417 marks. Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1994, at Cll. The Commission 
likewise performs these computations daily. It computes and publishes the value of an ECU in each Mem-
ber State's currency as well as the currencies of other major European countries and industrialized nations, 
including the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
106. For example, if a U.S. corporation agreed to purchase equipment in the U.K. 18 months hence for 
£2 million, it bears the risk that the dollar-to-pound exchange rate will become less favorable to the dollar. 
If the rate at the date of the contract were £I = $1.60, the £2 million would cost $3.2 million; if the ex-
change rate moves in favor of the pound to £1 = $1.85, that equipment would cost $3.7 million. The 
contract price could be stated in ECUs, using the dollar value on the contract date. Payment 18 months 
hence could be at the then-prevailing dollar-to-ECU rate. It may even be possible to provide that payment 
be made in ECUs. See SUNT, supra note 91, at 71-86, 115-17. Bonds and other debt instruments can be 
denominated and paid in ECUs. See ECU: THE CURRENCY OF EUROPE, supra note 91, at 52-Ill. 
107. See Mehnen, supra note 89, at 371. Using the figures in supra note 105, the weight of the mark 
on January 5, 1994, would be 32.14%, the mark ponion of the ECU as of the 1989 recomposition (.6242 
marks) divided by the mark value of the ECU (1.9417). See supra text accompanying note 102. 
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"weights" of the currencies in the basket, not the portions. 108 Obviously it 
is much easier to negotiate the appropriate participation of each currency in 
terms of "weights" or percentages rather than portions. In its original compo-
sition the ECU was defined in terms of portions of national currencies, not 
weights:09 In the two recompositions, in 1984 and 1989, the composition 
of the ECU was set in terms of weights as required by the Brussels Resolu-
tion, not portions; and the Council's action stating these recompositions were 
by regulations assigning weights on a date specified. 110 The portions of 
each currency in the ECU on the dates specified in those regulations were 
derived by the Commission,- working backwards from the weights: 11 Once 
determined, however, those portions are fixed. 112 The weights of the cur-
rencies in the ECU would continue to change as their values of the curren-
cies fluctuate against the dollar. 
The exchange rate stability so essential to accomplishing the monetary, 
and indeed the economic, union - as stated in the Treaty of Rome, as 
amended by the Single European Act113 and the Treaty on European 
Union114 - is effected through the ERM. The structure and the processes 
of the ERM are set forth in the Brussels Resolution and are restated in some-
what amplified terms in the Central Bank Agreement. Participation in this 
system is voluntary, however. Neither the Brussels Resolution nor the Central 
Bank Agreement state explicitly whether participation is mandatory or op-
tional. Participation is clearly optional, however. 115 At its most expansive 
108. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A2, § 3. 
109. Regulation Changing Value of EMF Unit, supra note 86. 
110. 1984 Regulation Amending Value of EMF Unit, supra note 99; 1989 Regulation Amending Value 
of EMF Unit, supra note 100. In the two recompositions, the relative percentages or "weights" of the 
currencies have changed to include additional currencies and to alter the percentages of the others as a 
result of the renegotiation of their weights according to the criteria stated. See text accompanying note 97. 
In the original composition, the percentages of the currencies were as follows: German mark -
32.98%; British pound- 13.34%; French franc- 19.8%; Italian lira- 9.5%; Dutch guilder- 10.51%; 
. Belgian and Luxembourg franc- 9.63%; Danish krone- 3.03%; and Irish pound- 1.15%. EDWARDS, 
supra note 20, at 319 n.l5. 
As set forth in the 1989 recomposition, weights of Member States' currencies were as follows: Ger-
man mark- 30.1%; British pound- 13.0%; French franc- 19.0%; Italian lira- 10.15%; Dutch guil-
der- 9.4%; Belgian franc - 7.6%; Luxembourg franc .3%; Danish krone- 2.45%; Irish pound-
1.1 %; Greek drachma - .08%; Spanish peseta - 5.3%; and Portuguese escudo - .8%. 1989 Regulation 
Amending Value of EMF Unit, supra note 100, art. 1. 
111. When the weights or percentages are .agreed upon, the portions of the currencies can be deter-
mined, if the value of each currency against an external commodity, the dollar, is known. 
112. It is thus still true that the ECU is comprised of fixed portions of Member State currencies. Al-
though the negotiated recomposition is done by weights, the portions are derived from the weights. Once 
derived, the portions remain fixed. 
113. EEC TREATY art. 102a (as amended 1987). 
114. EC TREATY art. 2 (as amended 1993). 
115. The Brussels Resolution notes that a Member State not participating in the ERM at the outset can 
do so later. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 1. The Central Bank Agreement is to the same 
effect, and the obligations under this Agreement are on "participating banks." Central Bank Agreement, 
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period, eleven of the twelve EC members, all but Greece, participated.116 
The ERM is a system to enforce exchange rate stability, and it operates 
through the medium of the ECU. The Brussels Resolution assigns the ECU 
several roles in this process. First, it is the denominator (numerane) for the 
ERM, and it is the basis of the divergence indicator. 117 The ERM operates 
not through the previously described floating value ECU, however. The Brus-
sels Resolution describes a slightly different ECU for purposes of the ERM; 
~.central 'rate against the ECU itself is assigned for each participating cur-
rtmcy expressed in that currency.118 The means by which this central, fixed 
nite is established and can be adjusted are variously stated. The Brussels 
Resolution provides that adjustments to the central rate are· subject to agree-
merit by a common procedure comprising all participating Member States 
and the Commission.119 The adjustments are thus a matter of agreement 
among the participants. The Central Bank Agreement is a bit more explicit in 
indicat~ng how these central rates are to be determined. It states that each 
participating central bank notify the Secretariat of the Committee of Gover-
nors of the Central Banks of a central rate for its currency in terms of the 
ECU. The Secretariat will provide this information to the other central banks 
and to the Commission. 120 Presumably, the rate each member unilaterally 
communicates is the rate agreed upon through the process set forth in the 
Brussels· Resolution. 121 This central rate is fixed and is expressed as a stated 
amount of participating currency as being the value of one ECU. 122 The 
central rates are fixed until there is an agreed upon realignment. Such re-
alignments have occurred much more frequently than recomposition of the 
supra note 87, at pmbl. see, e.g., id. art. l. 
116. The United Kingdom and Italy withdrew in September 1992. 25 BULL. E.C. No. 9 (1992), at 12-
13; see Philip Stephens et al., Sterling Is Suspended Within ERM, FIN. nMES, Sept. 17, 1992, at l. Non-
EC countries can effectively participate in the ERM and do so in anticipation of membership in the Com-
munity. For example, Norway and Sweden have done so. 
117. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A2, § 2(a), (b). The denominator or numerarie means 
simply that the process is carried out through the ECU. The divergence indicator is described infra note 
132 and accompanying text. 
118. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § I; Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 1.7. 
As stated in the Brussels Resolution, each currency will have an "ECU-related central rate." Brussels 
Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § I. To facilitate the later entry of these currencies into the ERM, a 
central rate also is assigned to non-participating currencies. 
!"19. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 2. 
120. Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. I. 
·121. In the communication issued regarding a realignment of central rates, reference was made to the 
process required by the Brussels Resolution. The Monetary Committee issued the communication and 
not~ that ''the ministers and central bank governors of the Member States of the European Community 
have decided by mutual agreement following a common procedure involving the Commission after consul-
tation with the Monetary Committee to fix new central rates in the EMS." 26 BuLL. E.C. No. I (1993), at 
19; see also 25 BuLL. E.C. No.9 (1992), at 12. 
122. For example, in the most recent realignment the ECU is said to have the following central rates in 
terms of national currencies: one ECU equals 1.95294 German marks or 6.64988 French francs. 26 BULL. 
E.C. No. I (1993), at 19. 
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ECU. 123 
Important as they are, the ECU central rates have a very limited function 
in the ERM. They are simply the medium through which a series or grid of 
bilateral currency conversion rates are determined. 124 The grid is a listing of 
the value of one currency in relation to each other currency computed 
through the medium of the ECU central rates. For example, if the agreed 
central rates were that one central rate-ECU equaled 2 german marks, 6 
french francs or 1200 italian lira, a value of marks expressed in francs or lira. 
could be derived. One german mark would equal 3 french francs, and 600 
italian lira. 125 Since the ECU central rates are fixed, the bilateral grid rates 
are likewise fixed until there is a realignment of the central rates. Moreover, 
since the central rates are fixed and do not represent market rates, the bilater-
al grid rates likewise are not· market rates. 
The core of the ERM is the agreement by the participating countries in 
the Brussels Resolution that their currencies will fluctuate only within speci-
fied margins of the various bilateral grid rates. In sum, the ERM is simply ~ 
commitment by participating Member States to assure that the free· market 
value of their currencies will remain within the permitted bands around each 
of the fixed bilateral grid rates. 126 Until August 1993, these margins were /-
2.25%, or in the case of the British pound, Spanish peseta, and Portuguese 
escudo, 6%. 127 On August 2, 1993, the finance ministers and governors of 
123. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 2. Since the inception of the EMS in 1978, there 
have been only two recompositions of the value of the ECU (1984 and 1989). By way of contrast, as of 
December 1993, there have been 17 realignments of central rates as provided in this article of the Brussels 
Resolution. The most recent realignment occurred in May 1993. 26 BULL. E.C. No. I (1993), at 19. 
124. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § I. " 
125. The Commission published a complete set of the bilateral rates, the value of each currency in 
relation to each other currency in conjunction with the August 2, 1993, announcement of changes in the 
ERM, and also in conjunction with the 1987 realignment of the rates when Spain joined the ERM. 26 
BULL. E.C. No.7 (1993), at 22; 20 BULL. E.C. No. I (1987), at 19; see also ROBERT MINIKIN, THE ERM 
ExPLAINED 16-17 (1993); Mehnert, supra note 89, at 374; ERM Parity Grid, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, 
at 2. 
126. This obligation, undertaken in 1978, is a refinement of the 1972 Baste Agreement, wherein it was 
agreed that rates would float 4.5% of a fixed rate. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
127. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, §§ 1, 6. Technically, the bands are not /-2.25%. To 
make ·the value of the grid consistent, the exact percentages are 2.275% and -2.225%. See EDWARDS, 
supra note 20, at 537 n.l82; GOLD, supra note 31, at 159; MINIKJN, supra note 125, at 15. The /-2.25% 
band will be used throughout these examples for simplicity and because the wider band agreed to in Au-
gust 1993 is said to be temporary. In the example given in the text accompanying note 125, the bilateral 
mark-to-franc grid rate would be: one mark equals three francs. The permitted trading range thus would 
be: one mark equals three francs /-2.25%, or one mark equals 3.675 to 2.932 francs. Conversely, the bilat-
eral grid rate for the franc expressed in marks would be: one franc equals .333 marks. The permitted fluc-
tuation of the mark in terms of francs would be .333 /-2.25%, or from .3405 to .3255 marks. The grids 
published by the Commission in 1987 and 1993 include the bilateral grid rate as well as the maximum 
and minimum currency values for all of the currency relationships. For ease, single currency units are not 
used for many of the currencies. For example, the computations are done using 100 Belgian/Luxembourg 
francs, 100 Danish krones, 100 French francs, I German mark, I Irish pound, 1000 Italian lira, 100 Dutch 
guilders, 100 Portuguese escudos, 100 Spanish pesetas, and I British pound. See supra text accompanying 
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the central banks agreed to a straight-forward but substantial modification of 
that commitment. The permitted bands of fluctuation were increased at that 
time to /-15% of the bilateral grid rates}28 All other aspects of the ERM 
procedures and obligations remain as they were. 
While this obligation to assure that the value of the currency remains 
within the permitted -band differs from that which the Member States have as 
members of the IMF, 129 the Brussels Resolution notes that the EMS - in-
cluding the ERM - is and will remain compatible with the obligations under 
the IMF. 130 Such an arrangement is specifically allowed by the IMF Arti-
cles.131 
A divergence indicator is used to forecast the need for governmental 
action to restore the relationship. The divergence indicator is the percentage 
of variation in bilateral rates from the fixed bilateral grid rates. The "thresh-
old of divergence" is crossed when the market rates of a particular currency 
relationship are at roughly 75% of the maximum allowable divergence, that 
is roughly 75% of the /-2.25% or now 15%, of the fixed bilateral grid 
rate. 132 At this point, the two countries are encouraged, but not obliged, to 
act. This encouragement is rather obliquely stated. The Brussels Resolution 
indicates that when the threshold of divergence is reached there "results ... 
a presumption that the authorities concerned will correct the situation by 
adequate measures ... .''133 When the divergence is at 100% - that is, 
when the value of the currencies are at or outside the established bands of /-
2.25% or now 15% - the countries are obliged to intervene to bring the 
values within the prescribed range. 134 
note 125. 
128. 26 BULL. E.C. No. 7-8 (1993), at 21-22. In all other respects, the procedures of the ERM remain 
as they were prior to that date. This change was in response to the summer currency crisis when several 
currencies, including the French franc and the Danish krone, were at or outside the permitted bands. It 
was uncertain whether the governments could correct their values, and it seemed possible that the ERM 
would collapse as a result. This modification was thought to be a less undesirable course. See James Blitz, 
Move Amounts to Suspension of System, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at l; Peter Marsh & Lionel Barber, EC 
Mounts ERM Rescue Bid, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at I. The communique announcing the agreement to 
make the change stated that it was a temporary measure made in response to the extraordinary speculation 
against the effected currencies. 26 BULL. E.C. No. 7-8 (1993), at 21. 
129. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
130. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. AS, § 3. 
131. International Monetary Fund Agreement, 2 U.N.T.S. 29, art. IV,§ 2(b)(ii) [hereinafter IMF Agree-
ment]; EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 536; see infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
132. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 5; Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 3.1. 
The "threshold of divergence" is not reached at precisely 75%. The ECU basket is the indicator of the 
threshold. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 5. But the currency in question must be eliminat-
ed from the value of the ECU as used for this computation. A formula determines the exact threshold 
point: .75 x 2.25 (or 6) (or 15) x I, minus the currency's weight in the ECU basket. See EDWARDS, supra 
note 20, at 543 n.203. 
133. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 6. 
134. /d. art. A3, § 4; Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 2.2. 
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lll. ISSUES AND COMMENTS ON PRESENT SYSTEM 
The essence of the ERM then is simply an effort to attain a stable cur-
rency relationship by obliging the participants to maintain the free market 
value of their currencies within fixed relationships to one another. There are 
numerous points to be made regarding this superficially quite straight-for-
ward obligation. The first is to acknowledge the serious nature of the August 
1993 announcement. If the purpose of the ERM is to force the confluence of 
exchange rates and stable currency relationships to ease the transition to a 
single currency as envisioned by the Treaty on European Union, m such a 
goal is significantly undercut by this change. An allowable fluctuation of up 
to 30% ( /-15%) around a fixed base hardly forces stable or very close cur-
rency relationships. Thus, the goals of the Treaty on European Union are 
seriously undermined, as are the prior thirty years ·or effort toward that 
goal. 136 While the structure of the ERM remains intact, the allowable bands 
hardly require much action to encourage confluence. 
Nonetheless, structurally the ERM remains as it was before August 1993. 
The ERM remains a set of bilateral obligations, the obligation of each partic-
ipating Member State is to keep the market value of its currency within the 
bands established for each participating currency. It is unclear, however, · 
whether this obligation is a matter of Community law and is enforceable as 
such. 
Prior to the Single European Act, the legal status of the ERM was un-
clear. The Brussels Resolution is an agreement among members of the Euro-
pean Council. This body was not a Community institution, and it had no role 
in Community-law making. 137 There was no reference to the ERM in the 
Treaty of Rome, and the entity making it had no status as a Community law 
making body. The Brussels Resolution did request the Council of the Com-
munities to take actions necessary to implement the ERM, 138 and the Coun-
135. See DELORS REPORT, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
136. In the communique announcing this change, the finance ministers and central bank governors 
emphasized the temporary nature of this modification as a response to extraordinary speculation and reaf-
firmed their determination to put the Treaty on European Union into effect as soon as ratification was 
complete. 26 BULL. E.C. 7-8 (1993), at 21. The Commission, in a communique issued on August 6, 1993, 
in response to the action, noted the gravity of the modification and the consequences for the economic and 
monetary union. /d. at 23. However, there is no immediate rush to return to the narrower margins. In fact, 
quite the opposite has transpired. In October 1993, the finance ministers and central bank governors of the 
Member States determined that the wider band would remain in place for the foreseeable future. Barber, 
supra note 12, at I; see also Blitz, supra note 128, at I; Peel, supra note 12, at I. 
137. See generally DAVID A.C. FREESTONE & J. SCOT DAVIDSON, THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 56-57 (1988); DOMINICK LASOK & JOHN W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 244-46 (5th ed. 1991); STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAU-
MONT, EC LAW 73-78 (1993); Daniel T. Murphy, European Political Cooperation After the Single Euro-
pean Act: The Future of Foreign Affairs in the European Communities, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 
335, 338-39 (1989). 
138. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A6, § I. 
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cil did so. 139 Hence, some of the implementing measures are clearly matters 
of Community law. However, the core of the ERM-is the commitment to 
defend currency values within the stated margins - is contained in quasi-
Community documents; and the Council was not requested to take action 
with respect to it. 140 Thus, the legal status of its pronouncements or agree-
ments was vague. The Single European Act added article 102(a) to the Trea-
ty of Rome.t41 Article 102(a) referred to the EMS and the ECU.t42 The 
Single European Act did not add the European Council as one of the Com-
munity institutions or grant it a role in the Community-law making process, 
but there was reference to the EMS in the Treaty. Arguably, this was suffi-
cient to obligate the ~embers participating in the ERM to fulfill their obliga-
tions as a matter of Community treaty law. 143 
The Treaty on European Union amended the Treaty of Rome to replace 
Article 102(a).t44 Article 102(a) as amended in the Treaty on European Un-
ion contains no reference to EMS or the ERM. 14s Moreover, the European 
Council - while assigned several roles - is not elevated as a Community 
law making institution.146 
139. /d.; see, e.g., Regulation Changing Value of EMF Unit, supra note 86 (creating the ECU, thereby 
implementing art. A2, § 3, of th.e Brussels Resolution); Decision Amending Medium-Term Financial As-
sistance, supra note 85 (increasing the amount of medium-term financial assistance, as a source of funds 
from which Member States' obligations could be met, as provided in art. A4, § 4, of the Brussels Resolu-
tion); Regulation Relating to European Monetary System, supra note 87 (broadening the authority of the 
EMCF). 
140. Rey, supra note 87, at 10 .. 
141. EEC TREATY art. 102(a) (as amended 1987). 
142. Article 102a reads as follows: · 
/d. 
In order to ensure the convergence of economic and monetary policies with is necessary 
for the further development of the Community, Member States shall cooperate in accor-
dance with the objectives of Article 104. In so doing they shall take account of the experi-
ence acquired in cooperation within the framework of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) and in developing the ECU, and shall respect existing powers in this field. 
143. Clearly, the first sentence of article 102a obligated Member States to cooperate to achieve the 
objectives of article 104. But the second sentence, wherein reference is made to the EMS and the ECU, is 
very oblique - so oblique, in fact, that it may not contain an obligation. The sentence apparently means 
that in the course of cooperating in accordance with article I 04, the parties shall take into account the 
experience in cooperation acquired within the EMS. This hardly creates an obligation to comply with the 
EMS obligations. But see GoLD, supra note 31, at 140; Louis, supra note 81, at 11, 26; Usher, supra note 
91, at 259. 
144. EC TREATY art. 102a (as amended 1993). 
145. Article 102a, as amended by the Treaty on European Union, reads as follows: 
/d. 
Member 'states shall conduct their economic policies with a view to contributing to the 
achievements of the objectives of the Community, as defined in article 2, and in the context 
of the broad guidelines referred to in article 103(2). The Member States and the Communi-
ty shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competi-
tion, favoring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set 
out in article 3a. 
146. Under the Treaty on European ·union, the tasks of the Community are still entrusted to the Parlia-
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The progress toward monetary union envisioned in the Treaty on Europe-
an Union is to be accomplished in stages. During the second stage, which 
under the Treaty is to commence January 1, 1994,147 four conditions are to 
be met before the members can proceed to complete monetary integration, 
including the single monetary policy' single central bank and single currency. 
Among these four conditions, two refer to the EMS and the ERM. 148 The 
Member States are to have observed the normal fluctuation margins of the 
ERM, without devaluation, for two years.149 Also the durability. of the con-
vergence of monetary policy of the members achieved through participation 
in the ERM must be evidenced by the level of long term interest rates. 150 It 
is. not clear whether these references state a Community law obligatio!\ to 
comply with the ERM procedures. The references are in the section of'the 
Tr~aty setting out conditions before the members can proceed to the third 
stage of monetary union, and participation in the ERM itself remains volun-
tary .lSI It is thus unlikely that the ERM obligations are enforceable by 
Community institutions, such as the Commission. 
Regardless of whether the ERM obligations are considered matters of 
Community law or some other form of international undertaking, these ob-
ligations would be owed to all participating members of the ERM, not just to 
the other side of the bilateral grid relationship. Since participation amo~g EC 
members in the ERM is voluntary, the obligation would appear not to be 
owed to the non-participating EC members. 
The obligation of each participant is to maintain the value of its currency 
within the permitted bands in relation to the other currencies, not in relation 
to the ECU, or some other external entity. Under the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment, there existed a set of currency par values in relation to the value of 
gold or the U.S. dollar, and a set of unilateral obligations whereby the signa-
tories agreed to maintain the value of their currencies at a value ·within 1% 
of the established par value.m Under the ERM there are bilateral obliga-
ment, Council, Commission, Court of Justice, and Court of Auditors. In addition, the Treaty on European 
Union created a European System of Central Banks, European Central Bank, and a European Investment 
Bank. TEU art. D. This treaty assigns the European Council two roles, one generally and one specifically. 
In general, it is to provide the Community (now Union) "with the necessary impetus for its development 
and shall define the general political guidelines." TEU art. D. More specifically, the Council is to play a 
role in economic policy. The Council, upon recommendation from the Commission, is to formulate the 
broad outline of guidelines for the economic policies for the Member States and the Community. It is to 
submit this draft to the European Council. The European Council is to reach a position on the draft. Based 
on its conclusion, the Council of the Community (or now Union) can proceed to adopt the guidelines. EC 
TREATY art. 103 (as amended 1993). 
147. EC TREATY art. 109e (as amended 1993). 
148. ld. art. 109(j)(l)(as amended 1993). 
149. The August 1993 widening of the margins was subsequent to the signing of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union. This condition in article 109j(l) must refer to the old margins. 
150. EC TREATY art. 109(j)(l) (as amended 1993). 
151. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
152. IMF Agreement, supra note 131, art. IV,§ 4(b). This is the version of the IMF Articles adopted at 
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tions. In the simple example previously given, the value of the german mark 
expressed in french francs is 3 french francs (the bilateral grid rate would 
show this as the value of marks expressed in francs). Since the obligation of 
each participant is to keep its currency within the permitted bands in relation 
to another currency, one currency cannot be in disequilibrium. If the value of 
the franc were to slip so that one mark were worth 4 francs, upon which 
country would the obligation to take corrective action fall? The logic of the 
bilateral grid is that both countries are obliged to intervene. Both currencies 
are either within or without the permitted bands,153 and thus the obligation 
would fall on both to correct the imbalance. Germany would be required to 
act to reduce the value of the mark in relation to the franc and France would 
be required to act to raise the value of the franc in relation to the mark. 154 
Since the bilateral grid rates show the maximum and minimum value of a 
currency in relation to another, and since both currencies float, there is a bi-
lateral obligation to maintain the currency relationship. Under the Bretton 
Woods Agreement, there were only unilateral obligations to maintain the 
specified value in relation to gold or dollars. These bilateral grid relation-
ships show the genius of the ERM. The participants are bound together in 
monetary policies. As a consequence of the policies causing the franc to 
weaken, not only is France obliged to take corrective action, but Germany is 
as well. France should consider the effects of its policies on Germany, and 
Germany legitimately has standing to be heard regarding them. 
The constitutive documents are not precise on the extent of this obliga-
tion, except that it is not unilateral. The Brussels Resolution states that when 
the threshold of divergence (75% of maximum divergence) is reached there 
Bretton Woods in 1944. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 8-9 nn.15-16, 491-531. The current 
obligation regarding exchange arrangements generally require consultation and cooperation in achieving 
stable exchange rates. Since currencies are no longer assigned par values, there is no obligation to defend 
a currency's value. Second Amendment to the Articles of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, 
29 U.S.T. 2204, 2208. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 502-71. 
153. In the simple example accompanying note 125, the bilateral grid rate would be one German mark 
to three French francs, the correlative would be one franc equals .333 marks. If the bands were /- 2.25%, 
the maximum and minimum allowable currency values would be: one mark equals 2.32 to 3.675 francs; 
and one franc equals .3227 to .3374 marks. If the franc were to slip so that one mark would equal four 
francs, the correlative would be one franc equals .25 marks. Thus, both currencies would be outside the 
permitted bands. 
154. During the summer of 1993 currency crisis involving the franc, this took place. The franc declined 
more than 75% of the allowed divergence from the fixed value in relation to the mark. The Bundesbank 
intervened to purchase francs. John Riding & Emma Tucker, Gennan Support Fails to Halt Franc's De-
cline, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at I; Gennany Supports Franc, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at 27. Howev-
er, during the September 1992 crisis involving the British pound, the onus seemed to be on the British 
government, with little help from the German Bundesbank. See Ivo Dawney, Britain Blames Bundesbank, 
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1992, at I; Stephens, supra note 117, at I. British ire was mostly directed at the 
Bundesbank's failure to reduce German interest rates rather than at the failure to sell marks and purchase 
pounds. Dawney, supra, at I. 
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will be a presumption that "the authorities concemed"15' will correct the 
situation. In instances of mandatory intervention, when maximum divergence 
is reached, "intervention in participating currencies is compulsory."156 In 
neither setting are the intervenors specifically identified. That the "interve-
nors" include both Member States to the particular bilateral grid relationship 
is evident. Although all EC Member States, even those not participating in 
the ERM, are obliged to assist the affected states through currency loans, 157 
it is not clear whether participating ERM countries not parties to the particu-
lar bilateral grid relationship are obliged to intervene with the purchase or 
sale of the currencies in question. 158 The Central Bank Agreement does not 
clarify this point. In fact the obligation in this regard is so obliquely stated 
that it is entirely unclear upon which Member States the obligation does lie. 
The Central Bank Agreement simply states that "[i]ntervention shall in 
principle be effected in the currencies of participating central banks."159 
The Brussels Resolution appropriately does not identify the entity or 
entities within each Member State responsible for carrying out the country's 
ERM obligations. Article 3.6 provides that when the threshold of divergence 
is reached, there is a presumption that "the authorities concemed"160 will 
take the specified forms of corrective action, while at the compulsory inter-
vention point, it simply states that "intervention is mandatory."161 The Cen-
tral Bank Agreement is no more explicit. It does not identify the currency 
intervenors. It provides only that interventions generally are to be in the 
currencies "of participating central banks."162 This is an agreement among 
central banks, and most of its obligations are stated in terms of."participating 
central banks."163 The Central Bank Agreement treats only intervention, cre-
ation of the ECU and the financing of intervention and other ECU transac-
tions. In so far as it relates to the ERM, all its obligations understandably are 
those of the central banks. There is no reference in this agreement to other 
means of correcting currency disequilibriums. At the threshold of divergence 
155. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 6. 
156. ld. art. A3, § 4. 
157. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
158. During the summer of 1993, when the French franc and Danish krone surpassed the 75% thresh-
old of divergence against the German mark, there was intervention in the currency markets by at least one 
other central bank. The Dutch central bank purchased francs and krones in an effort to boost their value. 
Pressure on Franc and Krone, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at I; see No Holiday for the ERM, FIN. TIMES, 
July 15, 1993, at 24. 
159. Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 2.2. 
160. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 6. 
161. /d. art. A3, § 4. 
162. Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 2.2. 
163. See, e.g., id. art. 2.1 (participating central banks are to notify the Secretariat of the Committee of 
Governors of the rates for compulsory intervention); id. art. 3.1 (participating central bank shall establish 
rates for its currency constituting the threshold of divergence); id. art. 6.1 (participating central banks shall 
open very short-term credit facilities to finance interventions). 
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(75% of maximum) many corrective measures other than currency interven-
tions are not entirely within the central banks' authority. The question of 
who are a participating Member State's appropriate actors is confused in part 
because of the differing relationships of the central banks to the govern-
ments.164 · 
The bilateral obligation in any instance of disequilibrium should reinforce 
the mutual dependence among participating states. The consequence of any 
state's particular monetary policies on other states must be taken into ac-
count. The _permitted fluctuation band encourages a country not to allow its 
currency to become too strong relative to one or more of the participating 
currencies, just as well it encourages a country not to allow its currency to 
become too weak: While this mutual dependance - or at least mutual con-
cern - should serve to reinforce the notion of interdependence within the 
Community, it is just as likely, or perhaps more so, that it is a source of 
friction and disharmony. 165 
Given the evolution during the 1970s from individual Member State 
action to Community based initiatives regarding monetary policy, 166 it is 
surprising that the constitutive documents contain no procedures or re-
quirements for concerted action to bring currencies back within the 
bands. 167 Both the Brussels Resolution and the Central Bank Agreement 
speak in terms of action by the relevant governmental entities, but they seem 
to contemplate unilateral action.168 No provisions are made for collaborative 
action or indeed for consultation and coordination of the unilateral action. 
The central rate ECU is simply a medium through which the bilateral 
exchange rates grid is computed. It has little other function. The bilateral grid 
164. The Bundesbank is completely independent from the Gennan government. At the other extreme, 
the Bank of England is an agency of the government. 
165. In September 1992 the British pound came under substantial pressure in relation to the mark. The 
pound was weak for various reasons, including the effects of a recession and high unemployment. The 
government lowered interest rates to stimulate the economy, which had the effect of decreasing the value 
of the pound. Germany was pursuing a high interest rate policy to combat inflation caused in part by 
reunification. Both countries, for legitimate domestic purposes, were pursuing inconsistent policies. The 
consequence was a considerable strain on the ERM rates between the mark and the pound. Britain expend-
ed significant sums defending the pound by purchasing pounds with marks and other currencies. Germany 
did not reciprocate by selling' marks for pounds or by lowering interest rates. The mutual obligations were 
not honored and became a source of friction. See lvo Dawney & Robert Graham, Major Calls for ERM 
Rejonn, FIN. TiMES, Sept. 19-20, 1992, at I; Dawney, supra note 154, at I; Quentin Peel, Sterling Plight 
Not Our Fault Bonn Insists, FIN. TiMES, Sept. 18, 1992, at 2; see also Alice Rawethorn, Franco-Gennan 
ERM Rift Denied by Finance Ministers, FIN. TiMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at I. 
166. See, e.g., supra notes 48-59, 61-76 and accompanying text. 
167. Other than the obligation to loan EMCF funds for currency intervention. See infra note 187. 
168. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3. "Intervention in participating currencies is compulsory 
when the intervention points defined by the fluctuation margins are reached." /d. art. A3, § 4. "When a 
currency crosses its 'threshold of divergence,' this results in a presumption that the authorities concerned 
will correct this situation by adequate measures." /d. art. A3, § 6. "Interventions shall in principle be 
effected in currencies of the participating central banks." Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 2.2. 
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rate and the maximum/minimum divergence from that grid rate are expressed 
directly in the currencies in question, not in ECU's. It is intended that the 
central rates and maximum/minimum divergence bands be public. 169 These 
intervention points should serve to narrow the market exchange rate fluctu-
ations since they would designate at the extremes the points at which the 
Member States will take corrective actions to maintain the stated margin. It is 
thought that this stability will also stabilize the value of the ECU. 170 Such 
stability would only be· of a "second generation," however. The general pur-
pose ECU is a composite of the stated portions or weights of EC member 
currencies and its value is computed in relation to the dollar. 171 The goal of 
the ERM is to achieve some reasonable stability among the participating 
currencies themselves. Their stability in relation to the dollar will also de-
pend on the market value of the dollar itself. 172 
While the common knowledge of the divergence points forces stability 
by establishing the points at which government action is required, it also 
enables the free market to test those limits by speculating against the curren-
cy with the knowledge that the government will intervene to prop up its 
value. Such speculation can intensify the downward spiral. 173 
When the 75% threshold of divergence is reached, there are a variety of 
countermeasures which may be taken to bring the currency value back to-
ward the bilateral grid rate. The Brussels Resolution notes that when the 
threshold of divergence is reached the authorities concerned will correct this 
situation by the following measures: i) intervention; ii) measures of domestic 
monetary policy; (iii) change in central rates; and (iv) other measures of 
economic policy}74 At this point, 75% of maximum divergence, the situa-
tion has not reached the absolute limits. It is thought that there is time for 
the various corrective measures to take hold and for the market rates 'to be-
come closer to the bilateral grid rates. The first two of these measures are 
unilateral in character, even though both sides to the parity grid relationship 
could take them. Direct intervention in the currency markets ought to have 
an immediate effect on the bilateral rates. Domestic monetary policy mea-
169. The central banks are to notify the secretariat of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks 
of the maximum and minimum intervention points as computed from the bilateral rate grid, and the mar-
ket shall also be notified of this. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A2, § 1. 
170. SUNT, supra note 91, at 13. 
171. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
172. This demonstrates the reverse of the proposition that the U.S. economy is in part dependent on the 
monetary policy among the EC countries. The value of the various EC currencies in terms of the dollar is 
in part dependent upon interest rates here and the other aspects of economic and monetary policy of the 
U.S. government and the Federal Reserve System. 
173. See, e.g., Peter Marsh et al., Future. of ERMin Balance, FIN. TIMES, July 31-Aug. 1, 1993, at I 
(noting that George Soras had changed his position and was not willing to speculate against the franc); 
John Ridding & David Buchann, Embattled Franc Fort Ready to Pull up Drawbridge, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 
14, 1993, at I. 
174. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 6. 
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sures include changes in central bank lending rates. They likewise ought to 
have the market effect of changing the currency's market value quickly. 
Other domestic economic policies, such as the government's spending policy, 
would have a less discernible and probably more gradual effect on the mar-
ket value. 
The third corrective measure, a change in the central rates, requires con-
certed action and agreement of all participating Member States and the Com-
mission.175 Such a measure is likely to be requested in the instance of a 
weak currency and may involve considerable political embarrassment. In a 
sense, correction of the imbalance by adjustment of the central rates is an 
admission of failure. It may entail a readjustment of the central rates to a 
value close to the market rate. It is thus taking corrective action by agreeing 
that the new fixed parity grid rate will be the former market rate, which was 
outside the bands of the former grid rate. 176 Yet there may be incentive 
among the other members to agree to a request for such a change, because 
the alternative may be for the member to withdraw from the ERM and allow 
its currency to float freely. However, by acceding to the change in rates, the 
other states run the risk that the free market rates of their currencies in rela-
tion to the currency in question will be farther above the new central rate. 
The fact that, within the ERM, changes in central rates can be effected only 
with the consent of the other states supports the notion that there are broadly 
based obligations among the ERM participants to defend the currencies of 
other participants. 
When 100% of maximum divergence from the central rates is reached, 
corrective action must be taken, and such action must be through currency 
intervention.177 Because of the immediate effect direct currency intervention 
has in altering market value, intervention should quickly bring the currencies 
175. The Brussels Resolution provides that central rate adjustments are subject to agreement by com-
mon procedure involving all participating currencies and the Commission. ld. art. A3, § 2. In 1990 Italy 
reduced the bands of fluctuation for the lira from 6% to 2.25%. This required a devaluation of the lira and 
an adjustment of all of the central rates. 23 BULL. E.C. No. I (1990), at II. Likewise, in September 1992 
the Italian government devalued the lira in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to ease pressure on the lira. 
25 BULL E.C. No. 9 (1992), at 12. See Lira Devalued 7% in EMS, FIN. TiMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at I. With-
in a week, the Italian government announced that it would not intervene in the currency markets. 25 
BULL. E.C. No.9 (1992), at 22. 
176. EC Treaty article 1090) requires, as a condition of moving to the final stage of monetary union, 
observance of the ERM bands for two years without resort to devaluation. EC TREATY art. 1090) (as 
amended 1993). This condition illustrates one reason that the Treaty on European Union's January 1, 1999 
deadline for monetary union is optimistic. This condition presumes that all Member States are ERM par-
ticipants, which is not presently the case. Moreover, there is no obligation to participate. Britain and Den-
mark will not participate in the final stage of monetary union unless they specifically agree to do so. EC 
TREATY protocols II, 12 (as amended 1993). In the event they do not, they are eliminated from the as-
sessment of whether the conditions referred to in article 1090) are met. Greece and Italy bave no such 
opt-in privilege. 
177. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 4. 
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back within the permitted margins. 178 
Generally currency interventions are to take place in the currencies of the 
participants, principally those of the parties to the particular bilateral grid rate 
relationship which is in disequilibrium; but this is not an exclusive require-
ment.179 The constitutive documents are unclear and inconsistent on this 
point. The Brussels Resolution notes that "in principle intervention are to be 
in participating currencies."180 The next section provides that 
"[i]nterventions in participating currencies is compulsory when the interven-
tion point defined by the fluctuation margins are reached."181 This section 
can be interpreted to mean both that intervention is compulsory at 100% of 
divergence, and that intervention in participating currencies is compulsory at 
that point. The Central Bank Agreement provides, like the Brussels Resolu-
tion that "[i]nterventions shall in principle be effected in currencies of the 
participating central banks. These interventions shall be unlimited at the 
compulsory intervention rates."182 The Central Bank Agreement supports 
the notion that all interventions, compulsory or discretionary, "in principle" 
are to be in the currencies of participating Member States, but not necessarily 
so. The Brussels Resolution, while ambiguous, can be read to reach the same 
conclusions. In fact, interventions, particularly non-mandatory interventions 
(at 75% of maximum divergence) are often made in other currencies, in 
particular the U.S. dollar. 183 Moreover, it is likely that interventions, if 
made in participating currencies, would be made in the currencies of the 
parties to the bilateral grid relationship in question. However, language from 
. the Brussels Resolution and the Central Bank Agreement supports the con-
178. Enormous sums were spent in the summers of 1992 and 1993 in efforts to prop up the British 
pound and French franc. In early summer 1992, Britain spent over $2 billion defending the pound. Colin 
Nalbrough, Reserves Are Depleted in Suppon for Sterling, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 3, 1992, at l. In 
September 1992 Britain borrowed £7.25 billion, mostly in German marks, from a group of international 
banks. It intended to use this "war chest" as the fund with which to defend the pound rather than deplete 
its own foreign currency reserves. Michael Clarke & Colin Narbrough, Lamont Guards Sterling with 7.25 
Shield, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 4, 1992, at 1. European central banks spent an estimated 50 to 70 
billion German marks (£19-27 billion) to prop up the French franc, Belgian franc and the Danish krone in 
1993. Marsh, supra note 173, at l. These government interventions were not· successful. Britain withdrew 
from the ERM because it could no longer afford the financial and political costs of intervention. See 
Stephens, supra note 116, at l. The ERM bands were widened in part because the sums France expended 
did not sufficiently raise the franc's value. See Marsh & Barber, supra note 128, at l. 
179. If the German mark/French franc bilateral grid rate exceeded maximum divergence, the sale of 
marks for currencies other than francs ought likewise increase the supply of marks and reduce its value 
overall, including its value against the French franc. The Brussels Agreement states that the interventions 
are to be made in participating currencies. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, §§ 3-4. This would 
rule out the use of non-participating currencies such as the dollar. It is not stated that intervention is to be 
only in the currencies of the two countries to the particular grid relationship. The Central Bank Agreement 
similarly omits any such statement. Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 2.2. 
180. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 3. 
181. /d. art. A3, § 4. 
182. Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 2.2. 
183. GoLD, supra note 31, at 154-55. 
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elusion that intervention can be in other participating currencies as well. 
The means whereby ERM currency interventions can be funded are like-
wise set out in the constitutive documents. The Brussels Resolution and the 
Central Bank Agreement provide that a very short term credit facility be 
established in unlimited amounts to serve as a source of any necessary exter-
nal funding of currency interventions.184 
At the point of maximum divergence, (100% of maximum divergence) a 
Member State's obligation is to take corrective action through currency inter-
vention.185 This obligation is without limit; the Member State is obliged to 
intervene in whatever amount is necessary to bring its currency within the 
band. 186 The very short term credit facility established in the Brussels Reso-
lution and the Central Bank agreement provides the means to accomplish 
such intervention, again in unlimited amounts. Under the terms of the very 
short term credit facility, the member bank of each Member State agrees to 
open an on demand line of credit in an unlimited amount of its own currency 
in favor of each ERM participating central bank.187 If a country is required 
to intervene to bolster its currency in terms of another currency, it will pur-
chase its own currency on the open market with the other currency. The open 
market amount of its currency is lessened, increasing the value of that which 
remains. The open market supply of the currency of intervention is increased, 
thereby lessening its value. Both currencies in any ERM bilateral grid rela-
tionship are either in mutual equilibrium or disequilibrium. 188 If the inter-
vening country uses as the currency of intervention that of the other party to 
the particular bilateral grid relationship, the effect should be that both curren-
cies will move back within the band. The currency being purchased on the 
market will increase in value, and that used to make the purchases will de-
crease. In making these purchases, the intervening country is satisfying the 
obligations of both parties to the particular grid relationship, but at its own 
expense. 189 
184. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 7; Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 6. 
See. generally EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 326-32; GoLD, supra note 31; at 152-60. Other Community-
based monetary support programs· and facilities are also available for this purpose. See generally Eo-
WARDS, supra note 20, at 332-41. 
185. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 4. 
186. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
187. All Member States, except Greece, are parties to this obligation. Since the purpose of this credit 
facility is to finance ERM-dictated currency interventions, those Member States not participating in the 
ERM may not draw against this facility. Under its terms, they may be obliged to Joan amounts of their 
currencies, with interest. EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 327. 
188. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
189. Typically, the onus to make these purchases has fallen on the weak currency countries. Both Brit-
ain and France bore the brunt of making these purchases against the mark. See infra note 178 and accom-
panying text. In making these purchases, the government will either expend its own reserves of the curren-
cy of purchase, or it will borrow this currency from international banks or through the EMCF. See supra 
note 178 and accompanying text; infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
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Functionally, the central bank requiring the other currency (the "borrow-
ing bank") may obtain the currency through the medium of the EMCF. The 
bank providing the currency (the "issuing bank") receives from the EMCF in 
exchange an amount of ECUs equal to the market value of the national cur-
rency committed.190 The borrowing bank's "acqqunt" with the EMCF is 
charged in a like amount of ECU' s. 191 While the amount of a borrowing 
bank's obligation to the EMCF and the EMCF's obligation to the issuing 
bank are stated in ECU's, the repayments themselves are in the currency of 
the borrowing state, the lending state or another national currency. 192 The 
appellation very short term credit facility is a slight misnomer. Repayment is 
due on the sixteenth day of the third month following the intervention,193 
and repayment can be extended under certain circumstances. 194 
As a means of funding this credit mechanism, as well as for other pur-
poses, the Brussels Agreement establishes a fund within the EMCF. Each 
participating central bank contributes 20% of its gold holds and 20% of its 
dollar reserves to the EMCF in exchange for ECUs. These contributions are 
by way of three month renew~ble swaps, which can be unwound, on two 
days notice. 195 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ERM as outlined in this piece continues in place and functions. 
Since the changes in the intervention bands announced in September 1993, 
the ERM has entered a period of quiescence. The system now functions with 
little public awareness because the resetting of the intervention bands has 
relieved the intense intervention pressure. This supposedly temporary mea-
sure means that there will be little need for intervention, as the new interven-
tion points allow significantly wider bands. ·Although these changes did not 
alter the structure of the ERM, its role as a device to force stable and close 
currency relationships as the prelude to monetary integration has suffered a 
tremendous setback. 
190. The amount of ECUs is the market value of the ECU in the currency committed at the daily mar-
ket rate on the date of intervention times the amount of national currency committed. 
191. Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, arts. 6, 7; EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 328. 
192. The obligations are denominated in ECUs. Changes in the value of the ECU as against the curren-
cy of payment will affect the actual amount of the payment. EDWARDS, supra note 20, at 328-31. 
193. Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 9. 
194. /d. art. 10. 
195. Brussels Resolution, supra note 84, art. A3, § 8; Central Bank Agreement, supra note 87, art. 17. 
